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York University, Adam Roberts of Oxford Univer-
sity, and the French jurist and politician Robert
Badinter-could not agree on the specifics of a
criteria-based approach.
One quibble: while the editors have done a ter-
rificjob in assembling an interesting, varied, and
accomplished mix of essays, they make no effort to
sort through the conflicting views advanced and
to provide the reader with a set of overall conclu-
sions. I suspect that the editors harbor strong views
on the subject-including a certain impatience
with textual legal arguments-but it would never-
theless have been interesting and valuable to see
the results of such an effort.
Overall, this volume is an excellent one, and
the reader of these lines will have detected how
much I enjoyed even those chapters I partially
disagreed with.
DAVID M. MALONE
International Peace Academy
International Organizations and International Dispute
Settlement: Trends and Pospects. Edited by Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare Romano, and
Ruth Mackenzie. Ardsley NY: Transnational
Publishers, 2002. Pp. xxiii, 283. Index. $85, cloth;
$45, paper.
Since the invasion of Iraq, a great deal of the
ongoing discussion concerning international insti-
tutions has focused on the implications for the
future efficacy of the UN Security Council and
also, more generally, of the United Nations itself.
Tojudge from the popular press even before the
standoff over Security Council approval of mili-
tary action in Iraq, multilateralism was already at
a low ebb, largely thanks to a chilly attitude on
the part of the United States. While this heated
debate addresses critical questions of interna-
tional law and policy in the new millennium, one
unfortunate consequence has been to distract atten-
tion from the important, if perhaps less widely
appreciated, positive developments analyzed by
this book.
As suggested by its title, International Organizations
and International Dispute Settlement takes on two
subject matter areas often considered distinct-
both of which are rapidly changing-and exam-
ines the dynamic interaction between them. The
present volume memorializes twelve contributions
to a conference held in 2001 by the Law Faculty
of the University of Geneva and the Project on
International Courts and Tribunals.
Professor Vera Gowlland-Debbas's contribution
on the relationship between the Security Council
and the new International Criminal Court (ICC)
is the most relevant of the topics for the post-Iraq
landscape. Gowlland-Debbas traces the evolution
of the Rome Statute, from the International Law
Commission's draft to the final version of the treaty,
on the question of the institutional role of the
Security Council, a political body, in the work of
the ICC, ajudicial one. She approvingly describes
changes in the draft that minimized the formal
role of the Security Council, arguing that politi-
cal controls over the work of the ICC are undesir-
able as a matter of principle and unnecessary as
a matter of practice. In addition to wagging an ad-
monitory finger at the Assembly of States Parties
to the Rome Statute about the remaining work on
defining the crime of aggression, she criticizes
proposals in which a finding by the Security Coun-
cil might be necessary as a condition precedent to
the ICC's exercise ofjurisdiction over this crime.
The approach of this essay is emblematic of
much legal scholarship on international dispute
settlement. One of the fundamental attributes of
an adjudicatory process is the degree of indepen-
dence of the decision maker. Legal analysis often
tends toward a normativejudgment that equates
impartiality and independence with greater insti-
tutional efficacy and higher-quality outcomes. Like
many of the authors in this book and much of
the extant legal scholarship, Gowlland-Debbas takes
this assumption as given, without attempting to
prove its veracity or even examining it critically.
But intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) by
their very nature are political institutions, governed
by law at the perimeter of their functions but none-
theless fundamentally concerned with reconcil-
ing often competing national policy imperatives.
States can be expected to be innately skeptical
of decision-making mechanisms not under their
direct control. There is consequently an inherently
high threshold for the creation of a truly indepen-
dentjudicial mechanism as a component of the
core functions of an IGO, and opportunities for
political intervention into judicial processes, such
as those described by Gowlland-Debbas, ought to
come as no surprise. While it is perhaps instinc-
tive for lawyers to view political intrusions into
adjudicatory functions as intrinsically suspect, in
the fluid and dynamic setting of international rela-
tions, intuitions about the relationship between
form and function can be misleading. Given the
function of the ICC, the desirability of a courtlike
model appears reasonably obvious. Nevertheless,
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the absence of political checks may well have con-
tributed to a very costly consequence in the form
of the United States' apparently complete aban-
donment of the institution. This tension between
the political andjudicial functions of international
institutions is the central, if largely unstated, theme
of this collection.
Much international legal scholarship assumes
that impartial dispute-settlement processes in
which the adjudicators are independent experts
appointed in their personal capacities are the
top-of-the-line option. It is crucial, however, to
frame such a treatment within a broader context.
A serious student of international institutions rap-
idly discovers that organs of international institu-
tions performing functions that appear to be adju-
dicatory in nature fall on a continuum with respect
to institutional independence. Understandably
for a work of modest length with a primarily legal
perspective, International Organizations and Inter-
national Dispute Settlement focuses on the portion
of the spectrum that most closely resembles for-
mal, binding, third-party processes in which the
decision makers are neutral and independent-
the international analogue of courts. With a
broader perspective, the situation grows more
complex, and crisp distinctions blur. Often the
notion of adjudication may itself be unattractive
to states, leading to institutions, organs, and pro-
cesses whose purpose is not to decide disputes,
but to facilitate observance of international norms.
Recent trends in international legal scholarship
addressing problems of compliance and effective-
ness have begun to catch up with the reality of
state behavior in IGOs, in which independent
courtlike mechanisms play only one part, and not
necessarily a large one.
Formal dispute settlement has limitations, most
notably a reluctance of states to invigorate adju-
dicatory processes that may well be applied to
their own detriment on another occasion. Wary
of the binding force of third-party mechanisms,
states may underutilize them. Nor is formal dis-
pute settlement necessarily responsive to many
real-world needs involving multilateral challenges
that do not come in the shape of classic disputes.
Less crisply legal, and perhaps more political,
review processes are not necessarily a distant sec-
ond best to formal, impartial dispute settlement.
The question is one of appropriateness to the task
from a functional point of view. While a higher
component of independence may very well be
desirable most of the time, independence is but
one of a number of attributes characterizing an
international institution and contributing to an
optimal mix from the point of view of effectiveness.
Steve Charnovitz analyzes one such institution,
the dispute settlement process of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). He describes the tension
between the courtlike Appellate Body and the Dis-
pute Settlement Body, consisting of representa-
tives of WTO member states, and convincingly
argues that the structural rules governing the rela-
tionship between them tends to weigh in favor of
independence. Indeed, one of the principal inno-
vations in the Uruguay Round of trade negotia-
tions was to encourage an approach to dispute
settlement characterized more by respect for the
rule of law and less susceptible to political factors.
Somewhat ironically, nearly a decade after the
creation of the WTO, the pendulum has swung in
the opposite direction, with scholarly questioning
of the legalization of institutions such as the WTO
dispute settlement process, which was originally
conceived as a conciliatory function.
1
In an anecdote that demonstrates how difficult
it is for international institutions to establish them-
selves as genuinely independent, Charnovitz relates
the largely unreported history of Canada's chal-
lenge to France's ban on the importation of asbes-
tos and asbestos-containing products.2 After the
Appellate Body indicated its intention to accept
submissions from nonstate actors such as nongov-
ernmental organizations, professional societies,
and corporations-in a posture roughly analogous
to that of amicus curiae briefs in domestic tribu-
nals-the General Council, the WTO's plenary
body, in effect overruled the Appellate Body, an
institution with attributes closer to ajudicial organ,
before it rendered a final decision. This episode
raises serious and troubling questions not only
concerningjudicial independence, but also con-
cerning both the appropriate roles of the orga-
nization's principal organs and the interaction
among them-the international equivalent of sep-
aration of powers-and the minimum procedural
guarantees afforded in a judicial setting-the
international equivalent of due process.3
' See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello,
& Stepan Wood, International Law and International Rela-
tions Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,
92 AJIL 367 (1998).2Appellate Body Report, European Communities-
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (discussed in case report
at 96AJIL435 (2002)).
Very similar questions have recently arisen in the
context of Chapter 11 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement-the investment provisions of that
treaty. For example, Sir RobertJennings, former presi-
dent of the International Court of'Justice, writing in an
expert capacity on behalf of a party in an investor-state
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Accepting Charnovitz's implied invitation,
Christine Chinkin (of the London School of Eco-
nomics) and Ruth Mackenzie undertake a thor-
ough survey of amicus practice in a variety of
international institutional settings. Mackenzie is
affiliated with the London-based Foundation for
International Environmental Law and Develop-
ment, an organization that has represented non-
state entities in the asbestos dispute and other
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. These au-
thors identify an underappreciated potential for
IGOs to serve as "friends of the court" in interna-
tional dispute settlement. While this suggestion
is a reasonable one, the essay largely overlooks sig-
nificant constraints facing IGOs in such a posture.
In developing their position, Chinkin and Mac-
kenzie touch briefly on the limited prior practice
that there is (for example, in the Organization of
American States and the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization), but many questions remain
unanswered.
Most obviously, what organ of the institution
speaks on behalf of the organization in an ami-
cus capacity? Does the secretariat of an interna-
tional institution have the authority independ-
ently to speak on behalf of the IGO, or must the
professional staff of the institution seek approval
of the member states? Presumably, the answer to
this question depends, at least to some extent, on
the constitutive instrument of the organization,
implying that an institution-specific analysis would
be required. Because the states party to the under-
lying dispute may also be members of the IGO
considering an amicus submission, the disputing
parties could well be in a position to influence the
content of the IGO's participation as a "friend of
the court." Is that appropriate? If not, how would
potential conflicts of interests be addressed? And
what if only one side of the dispute is repre-
sented in the IGO? These are but some of the
issues, both principled and practical, that may
account for the existence of so few instances in
which IGOs have actually taken advantage of the
opportunity to be heard in an amicus capacity.
Andr6s Rigo Sureda, former deputy general
counsel at the World Bank, addresses the theme
of independence from a different perspective in
dispute, has criticized the NAFTA parties for a "legislative"
intervention apparently intended to apply to pending
disputes. See [Methanex's First Subrnission Concerning
the NAFTA Free Trade Commission'sJuly 31, 2001, Inter-
pretation], attachment (Sept. 18,2001), Methanex Corp.
v. United States (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 7, 2002)
(Second Opinion of Robert Y. Jennings), at <http://
www.international-economic-law.org/Methanex/>.
analyzing the Bank's Inspection Panel and anal-
ogous mechanisms at the regional development
banks. The Inspection Panel does not easily fit
the mold of formal, binding, third-party dispute
settlement. At least in theory, the functions of the
panel-the first institution to engage in something
approaching external review of the performance
of an IGO-are investigatory.and not adjudicatory.
Although the decision makers (the three mem-
bers of the panel) are independent personalities,
the Bank's Board of Executive Directors is a polit-
ical organ that retains the power to terminate the
process at an interim juncture. The panel, more-
over, receives legal advice from the Bank's man-
agement, the same entity whose performance is
subject to scrutiny by the panel. Rigo Sureda
describes with reasonable candor the tug of war
between the panel and management over the pan-
el's independence, a story largely untold in the
existing literature. Generalized beyond the con-
fines of the specific situation it examines, this con-
tribution teaches that independence is neither ab-
solute nor entirely a product of structural features,
but, rather, an attribute that new international
institutions such as the Inspection Panel must
fight to establish early in their existence, if at all.
Nongovernmental input into WTO dispute
settlement and the World Bank Inspection Panel
are representative of another important trend that
pervades this volume, but that is not addressed
on its own terms: the increasing creation of entry
points for nonstate actors into the work of inter-
national institutions. This trend represents a major
innovation in public international law, which typ-
ically is confined to articulating a flow of rights
and obligations among states and acknowledges
no role for corporations, private nonprofit orga-
nizations, or individuals-none of which are sub-
jects of international law. For example, the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooper-
ation (NAAEC) ,4 the environmental "side agree-
ment" to the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), creates a mechanism that can be
initiated by private parties from any of the three
party states to challenge ineffective enforcement
of domestic law. The Secretariat of the Commis-
sion for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), the
trilateral institution established by the NAAEC, is
charged with preparing a "factual record" in
response to citizen submissions. The history of this
process, in which the NAFTA governments must
approve the subsequent preparation of a factual
record at a decision point midway through the full
'32 ILM 1480 (1993).
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process anticipated by the agreement, has been
remarkably similar to that of the World Bank's
Inspection Panel. Like the panel, the CEC's sec-
retariat has been engaged in an ongoing struggle
with its governmental masters to establish its
independence, credibility, and effectiveness as
an institution.5
In a manner that parallels the subject matter it
addresses, International Organizations and Interna-
tional Dispute Settlement communicates both the
excitement of cutting-edge developments and the
frustrations resulting from the constraints im-
posed by existing doctrine. In the latter category,
Tullio Treves and Christian Dominic address the
role of IGOs in, respectively, contentious cases
and advisory opinions in the International Court
ofJustice (ICJ). Treves, ajudge on the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, analyzes
selected aspects of the extension of the Tribunal's
extension ofjurisdiction to include IGOs as poten-
tial parties to contentious cases-a departure
from the ICJ's limitation to states. Dominic6, in
turn, acknowledges that the Court's advisory
opinion jurisdiction is a partial, although imper-
fect, response to the need identified by Treves.
Building on these authors' work, Anne-Marie La
Rosa identifies an apparent anomaly in which the
Constitution of the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO) purports to create jurisdiction in
the ICJ over a class of cases that might be pre-
cluded by the Statute of the Court because the
ILO, an international organization, would be the
respondent.
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes touches on
similar themes in a chapter in which she argues
that the ICJ, through its advisory opinionjurisdic-
tion, has taken on "many global policy issues ...
[in] a quest for a legal answer to public policy
concerns" (p. 109). In what amounts to a call for
judicial activism, she then articulates how greater
transparency and openness might enhance the
perception of the legitimacy of the Court's pro-
nouncements. The ICJ's advisory opinion on Legal-
ity of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 6 probably
comes closest to the ideal she espouses. Using
that opinion as an example, one might well ask,
however, whether such an approach would en-
hance or erode the stature of the Court. While
the Court's opinion makes interesting reading as
an attempt to nudge the law in positive directions
5 See, e.g., GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN
COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTALCOOPERATION (David
L. Markell &John H. Knox eds., 2003).
' 1996 ICJ REP. 226 (July 8).
against a background of practical constraints, it
is not at all apparent that the ICJ's pronounce-
ment, bold though it may be, will have any effect
on the real world of arms control.
7
Taking Dominic6's and Boisson de Chazournes's
analyses of the potential uses of ICJ advisory opin-
ions one step further, it would be illuminating to
examine the limits of the Court's advisory opin-
ionjurisdiction when a request from an IGO also
engages questions of the rights and obligations of
particular states, as is not infrequently the case. In
such settings, the line between the subject matter
that might be addressed through an advisory opin-
ion and the subject matter amenable to treatment
as a contentious case could be unclear, with the
states whose interests are affected objecting to what
might be perceived as an abuse of IGOs' unique
prerogative to request an advisory opinion from
the ICJ.
Chapters on the role of the European Union
(EU) by Allan Rosas and Andrew Clapham fit
rather uncomfortably within the broader struc-
tural design of the book. This question of fit has
nothing to do with the quality of the authors'
contributions, which are quite informative, but
with the unique status of the EU. A supranational
organization that exercises some functions tradi-
tionally understood to be the prerogative of sover-
eign states, the EU has a much more highly devel-
oped internal legal structure than most intergov-
ernmental organizations. By comparison with the
EU, which has much the character of an interna-
tional government, other IGOs such as the United
Nations are more akin to forums for resolving
collective-action problems, ordinarily on a con-
sensus basis. Similarly, in its external relations the
EU enjoys the use of international legal mech-
anisms, such as special provisions allowing it to
become party to multilateral treaties, that are dif-
ferent in kind from those characteristic of most
IGOs. Analyses of the EU's situation, both internal
and external, on issues such as those addressed
by the present work, may be of interest in their
own right, but generalizations that might apply
to other IGOs are few. As applied to the EU, the
subject matter of the present volume is enormously
complex; a thorough treatment of the EU by ref-
erence to the internal and external aspects of
7 See, e.g., MichaelJ. Matheson, The Opinions of the lnter-
national Court ofJustice on the Threat or Use of Nuctear Wea-
pons, 91 AJIL 417,435 (1997) (analysis by principal dep-
uty legal adviser of U.S. Department of State concluding
that "whether the Court's opinion will hasten the day
when nuclear weapons are eliminated,.., it was never
reasonable to think that the Court could do so").
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international dispute settlementwould be worthy
of a book-length treatment in its own right. That
said, Clapham's chapter on the application of the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights to the EU teaches how international tribu-
nals such as the ECHR can creatively overcome
formal limitations on their jurisdiction, which
does not include the EU.
Like many multiple-author volumes, International
Organizations and International Dispute.Settlement
might have benefited from a somewhat firmer
editorial hand to assure that the individual contri-
butions fit into a broader architecture that leaves
the reader with a clear message. But perhaps this
limitation is only an artifact of the subject matter,
itself in transition. Both now and as international
cooperation continues to evolve-as it inevitably
will, even in what has become a less than congenial
climate-International Organizations and Interna-
tional Dispute Settlement will serve the important
function of documenting current developments
at the turn of the millennium.
DAvID A. WIRTH
Boston College Law School
Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. By Michael
Ignatieff. Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2002. Pp. xxvii, 176. Index. $35, cloth;
$12.95, paper.
This book consists of two short essays by Michael
Ignatieff, director of the Carr Center for Human
Rights Policy at Harvard University, accompanied
by commentaries by Amy Gutmann (who has also
written the introduction), Anthony Appiah,
David Hollinger, Thomas Laqueur, and Diane
Orentlicher. The essays are thoughtful and provoca-
tive, and there is much here that deserves wider
discussion within the human rights movement and,
indeed, among international lawyers generally.
While closely related, Ignatieffs essays, "Human
Rights as Politics" and "Human Rights as Idola-
try," focus on different themes. In the first piece,
Ignatieff challenges the notion that "human rights
is above politics, a set of moral trump cards whose
function is to bring political disputes to closure
and conclusion" (p. 21). In addressing the limits
of human rights (Ignatieff uses the term loosely,
but it appears that his challenges are directed at
both human rights lawyers and nonlawyer activ-
ists), Ignatieff explores the changing relationship
between human rights and sovereignty. He sug-
gests that too great an emphasis on human rights
broadly defined may lead to instability and, per-
versely, to greater violations of human rights in
the short and medium term. He observes that
"stable states" are "the most important protector
of human rights" (p. 23), and it would be difficult
to argue that instability and resulting wars in the
Balkans, the Great Lakes region of Africa, and the
southern tier of the former Soviet Union (all cited
by Ignatieff) have not led to gross violations of
human rights and humanitarian law.
While gross violations of human rights are often
themselves sources of instability, Ignatieff sug-
gests that forceful intervention to protect human
rights is actually undermining the legitimacy of
human rights, "both because our interventions are
unsuccessful and because they are inconsistent"
(p. 39). Offering the Kosovo Liberation Army as
an example, he notes that intervention may reward
violence-although no such argument stopped
the Independent International Commission on
Kosovo (of which Ignatieff was a member) from
concluding that the NATO bombing was "illegal,
yet legitimate."' Ignatieff's brief discussion of
"humanitarian" intervention adds nothing new
to the debate, but it does highlight the conflicts
between human rights ends and means.
In a theme to which he returns in the second
essay, Ignatieff emphasizes the importance of con-
stitutionalism-as opposed to the simplistic impera-
tive of electoral democracy-in the protection of
human rights. "[T] he chief threat to human rights
comes not from tyranny alone, but from civil war
and anarchy. Hence,... the liberties of citizens
are better protected by their own institutions than
by the well-meaning interventions of outsiders"
(p. 35).2 Ignatieff echoes John Rawls's call for
acceptance of less-than-democratic states as pref-
erable to an insistence on new, often untenable,
forms of the liberal democracy generally espoused
by outsiders, 3 although he at times confuses the
' INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo
REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS
LEARNED 186 (2000).
2 One example of such a "well-meaning interven-
tion" might be the strident opposition of mainstream
human rights groups to adoption of the quasi-traditional
process of gacaca to deal with the more than 100,000
persons still imprisoned in Rwanda for their alleged
participation in the 1994 genocide. While gacaca cer-
tainly falls far short of international "fair trial" standards,
insistence on the latter could result only in much more
serious violations of the rights of those accused who
would remain in prison indefinitely, absent anyalterna-
tive means of determining their guilt or innocence.
3 Rawls refers to such societies as "nonliberal" or
"decent hierarchical" peoples. See generally JOHN RAWLS,
THE LAW OF PEOPLES 59-88 (1999).
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